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In Pakistan, the issue of religious freedom is deeply embedded in the trajectory of 
the political construction of religious identity, a process that has caused severe violations 
of human rights for many groups, particularly the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.  This 
community has been historically excluded and discriminated by law and society on the 
basis of religious distinction. The question of exclusion and persecution may be unpacked 
through a critical analysis of the role of secularization, and particular variants of 
secularism exclusive to non-Western states. The objective of this paper will be to address 
the difficulty of applying a simplistic rendition of a Western template of secularization in 
Pakistan and the difficulty of repair. I will argue that the vision of Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, the primary founding father of Pakistan, had been the most prime example of how 
both secularism and religious moral ethos may be negotiated to yield a form of 
secularism that is exclusive to non-Western states with regards to religious identity. It is 
this framework that ought to be kept in mind when approaching the Ahmadi issue today 



















The past several decades have rapidly witnessed a defining and transformative re-
shaping of the world as it was once acknowledged. As a result of decolonization and 
globalization, states and “nations” emerged that were defined not merely through 
territorial characteristics but rather through a number of elements—most predominately 
that of identity—perhaps best encapsulated by Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined 
communities.”1 Out of this struggle for defining identity and of addressing identity no 
longer as a matter of the individual in a private sphere or community, but rather as a 
larger collective self-understanding and within the hands of the state—the issues that 
emerged were momentous, particularly when addressing the role of religion in the state as 
a core element of national identity. The nature of nationalism, especially when seen 
through politically religious or ethnic majoritarianism, plays an immense role in the state 
and society’s shaping of institutional exclusion and inclusion in the process of nation-
building. When a nation is in its infancy and is grappling with multiple visions of national 
identity and meaning, it becomes open to the monopolization of certain groups vocalizing 
for a particular identity. As I will demonstrate in the case of Pakistan, the struggle for 
defining national identity and the defining the institutional boundaries of the state is a 
struggle that has greatly affected many people and minority religious groups. In Pakistan, 
the issue of religious freedom is deeply embedded in the trajectory of the political 
construction of religious identity, a process that has caused severe violations of human 
rights for many groups, particularly the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.  This 
community has been historically excluded and discriminated by law and society on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Verso Publications. New York. 1983 
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basis of religious distinction. The question of exclusion and persecution may be unpacked 
through a critical analysis of the role of secularization, and particular variants of 
secularism exclusive to non-Western states.  
When analyzing the political, social and theoretical elements of the issue of 
religious minorities in Pakistan, the discussion of secularism’s role and possibility in the 
state is often addressed in the search for solutions and repair. However, the binary 
approach through which secularism has been understood in the case of Pakistan is 
problematic because it is only understood through a Western understanding of secularism 
of the separation of church and state. Many, including political scientists Rajeev 
Bhargava and Christophe Jaffrelot, have proposed a variant of secularism that is 
exclusive to the non-West that uses religion as ideology, or in other words, which uses 
religious moral content in order to promote state administered tolerance and rights. The 
objective of this paper will be to address the difficulty of applying a simplistic rendition 
of a Western template of secularization in Pakistan and the difficulty of repair. It is the 
inadequacy of the idea of applying a Western understanding of secularism and the 
difficulty in removing political Islam from the state, politics, and social realms that make 
repair and solutions unattainable and therefore requiring nuance. Noting this, it is 
important to trace the issue back to Pakistan’s birth and highlight three main visions by 
spokesmen Jinnah, Iqbal and Maududi with regards to the role of religion in the state. I 
will argue that Jinnah’s Pakistan had been the most prime example of how both 
secularism and religion may be negotiated to yield a form of secularism that is exclusive 
to non-Western states with regards to religious identity. It is this framework that ought to 
be kept in mind when approaching the Ahmadi issue today and formulating solutions.   
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This paper will first examine and describe the scope of the discrimination and the 
human rights abuses with particular regard to religious freedom. Second, in order to 
understand the way religion has played a role since Pakistan’s birth, it will analyze three 
factors that have generated the Ahmadi question, namely, religion, national identity and 
law, especially through a historical perspective. Here, I will be looking at the idea of 
“vision and division,” and analyze the visions of three of Pakistan’s main spokesmen—
Jinnah, Iqbal and Maududi. I will examine how over time, through significant political 
and historical events, Jinnah’s Pakistan, which embodied the values of both the Muslim 
identity and secularism, had been diluted and Ahmadis found themselves at the receiving 
end of this dilution. This will include the formulation of the Blasphemy Laws and the 
unconstitutionality and Un-Islamic nature of these laws. Thirdly, it will then shed light on 
other templates in the Islamic world, including Indonesia and Senegal that have in many 
ways embodied a non-Western variant of secularism with a balance of religious ethos and 
state protection of rights. Using these templates, along with Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan 
as the framework, Pakistan’s Blasphemy laws may be unpacked and reimagined as a 
starting point for gradual change.   
 
Section I: Human Rights & Religious Freedom in Pakistan 
A discussion of the condition of human rights in Pakistan with specific regard to 
religious freedom is incomplete without a critical examination of Pakistan’s state 
implementation of human rights in the law and constitution and an overview of human 
rights violations. This introductory section is divided into three parts. I will first briefly 
outline the rights enshrined in the Pakistani constitution and law with particular attention 
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to religious freedom. The second section will describe the key features of the Ahmadiyya 
Muslim sect of Islam and the distinctions between mainstream Islam that have fueled the 
persecution of the community. The third section will then provide a general overview of 
the scope and shape of the persecution against the Ahmadis in Pakistan, with particular 
attention to the controversial Blasphemy laws.   
Rights in Pakistan’s Constitution(s) 
  Pakistan is currently a democratic state that has been sculpted by frequent 
transitions of both military dictatorships and democratic law at various moments in its 
brief history. Since its birth, Pakistan has adopted three constitutions, each with many 
amendments and reforms throughout the years. It is interesting to note the trajectory of 
these constitutions as their changes have correlated with the degree of Islamization of the 
country over time. While the rights attributed in each of the constitutions have remained 
steady and comprehensive in their scope, other reforms and amendments have been 
incorporated and strengthened that counter the potency of the rights declared in the 
constitution. The Blasphemy Law and other related laws established in the Pakistan Penal 
Codes are some of the main sources of deterrence to the actualization of the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the current constitution, which will be discussed further in this paper.  
The rights in the earliest constitution of 1956 have been briefly discussed as 
understood by the Objectives Resolution of 1949 under Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan 
which became a part of the Constitution of Pakistan shortly after. The Objectives 
Resolution, a preamble to the first constitution of Pakistan, formally described the role of 
religion and democracy in the new state and proposed that Pakistan will be an Islamic 
democratic state and emphasized both Western and Islamic ideals of democracy. The 
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Resolution highlighted many fundamental rights including political, economic and social 
rights and specifically affirmed the rights of religious minorities to worship freely, as I 
will describe below. It emphasized the values of democracy, tolerance and equality 
inherent in the Islamic doctrine. 2 
The Objectives Resolution is a crucial document in Pakistan’s history. Many cite 
it as laying the foundations for the Islamization that occurred in the decades following 
Pakistan’s birth since it declared Islam as the state religion but not yet a theocracy. The 
time, context and nature of this document are reflective of a greater theoretical analysis of 
the Islamic identity in Pakistan and how it began to take shape during Pakistan’s infancy. 
This paper will conduct a closer reading and analysis of this document in its discussion of 
Pakistan’s particular variant of secularism and understanding of the role of religion in 
section II.  
The second constitution of 1962 under military leader Ayub Khan granted many 
similar rights to those in the Objectives Resolution but the nature and formulation of 
political Islam began to take form in this constitution as demonstrated by the addition and 
strengthening of certain laws.3 The 1973 constitution, which was adopted under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, is the constitution that is still 
functioning today. It is a comprehensive document that describes the branches of 
government, the fundamental rights of the Pakistani people, and the laws and orders of 
the state. Part II, Articles 8-28 list all the fundamental rights in depth, including security, 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, the right to a fair trial, the right not to be subject 
to forced labor, the right to be free from torture, freedom of movement and assembly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 History of Pakistan, “Objectives Resolution, 1949,” http://historypak.com/objectives-resolution-1949/ 
3 History of Pakistan, “Constitution of 1962,” http://historypak.com/constitution-of-1962/ 
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freedom of business, the right to freedom of speech, the right to information, freedom of 
religion, safeguards against taxation towards any specific religion, safeguards in 
educational institutions with regards to religion, right to education, non-discrimination in 
public places and property rights. Furthermore, section II, chapter 2, article 36 states that 
“the State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their 
due representation in the Federal and Provincial services.”4  
While all these rights are enshrined in the Pakistani constitution, ordinances in 
other parts of the constitution and in the Pakistan Penal Codes, such as the Blasphemy 
Law, counter the realization and implementation of those rights. As the dilution of the 
Islamic ethos of toleration, fundamental rights and equality occurred over the course of 
Pakistan’s history, the ultraconservative and orthodox branch of Sunni Islam, or 
Wahabbism, and Wahabbi-informed political Islam sculpted and created space to 
strengthen the ethos of inclusion and discrimination in the law and in the social climate of 
Pakistan. This paper will demonstrate the ways and trajectory through which this has 
occurred and how ideological schools of political thought with regards to Islam paved the 
way for very real manifestations of rights violations as a result of identity-construction 
and identity-exclusion.  
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and the Claim to Islam 
To begin to understand the root of the conflict, it is important to understand the 
community and the distinctions of belief between mainstream Islam and the Ahmadi 
Community that have caused the systematic persecution of this community specifically.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In this section, I will briefly explain the core features of the Ahmadi belief and the key 
differences from the larger mainstream Sunni Muslim doctrine.  
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community was founded in British India in a town 
called Qadian in Punjab at the end of the 19th century. The founder of the Ahmadiyya 
Community was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who claimed to be the promised Messiah or 
Mahdi. Ahmadiyya was founded as a revival or reformist sect of Sunni Islam. Core 
principles of Ahmadiyya follow all of the basic principles of Islam: the six articles of 
faith which are the belief in One Supreme God, belief in all the angels of God, belief in 
all of the books of God including the Torah, the Bible and especially the Quran, belief in 
all of the prophets of God including Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, belief in 
the Day of Judgment and the afterlife, and belief in the Decree of Allah (God). Ahmadis 
pray five times a day, fast during the holy month of Ramadan and believe in all of the 
core teachings and guidance of the Holy Quran, the hadith (sayings) and sunnah (actions) 
of the Prophet Muhammad.  
There are mainly two distinctions in belief between “mainstream” Sunni Islam 
and the Ahmadis. First is the belief that Jesus did not die on the cross but rather he died a 
natural death in Kashmir in order to fulfill his mission to preach to the lost tribes of 
Israel. The second belief is the coming of the Messiah from a follower of the Prophet 
Muhammad and that is believed to be, through prophecies and revelations, Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad who lived and propagated his message in Qadian, Punjab, India from 1835-1908.5  
The main objection that is raised involves the belief of the Prophet Muhammad as 
Khateman-Nabiyeen, which means “Seal of the Prophets.” In the mainstream Islamic 
belief, the “seal of the prophets” is interpreted as the “last of the prophets,” or the “final 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mahmud Ahmad, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din. Invitation to Ahmadiyyat. The London Mosque, 1980. 
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prophet,” meaning no other prophet can come after the Prophet Muhammad. However, 
the word “seal,” according to Ahmadi belief, implies the sealing of a document, for 
example. In other words, Ahmadi belief contends that the message, guidance and spiritual 
law that the Prophet Muhammad delivered was the final message, however, “seal” does 
not imply finality of prophethood. Ahmadis believe that the message that Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad proclaimed was the revival of the same message that the Prophet Muhammad had 
delivered in Arabia hundreds of years before him.6  It is out of this distinction and matter 
of interpretation that Ahmadis all over the world are considered outside the folds of 
mainstream Islamic doctrine.  
Among an estimated 3-4 million Ahmadis living in Pakistan today, comprising of 
about 3.4%-4% of the population.7 A large majority of them, approximately 100,000 
members, live in the headquarter town of Rabwah in the Chiniot District of the Punjab 
Province.8 Soon after the Partition of India in 1947, many Ahmadis settled there in order 
to establish a safe haven for the community. The town was named Rabwah, an Arabic 
word from the Quran meaning “an elevated place.”9 As the Islamization/Wahabbization 
project continued to progress and succeed in Pakistan’s recent history, one of the prime 
examples of the solidification of their exclusion and material manifestation of the 
Blasphemy Laws was the ruling to change the Islamically-derived name of their safe 
haven. In 1999, the Punjab Assembly passed a resolution to change the name of the town 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “A Misunderstanding Removed- Ahmadis Do Believe in the Holy Prophet (saw) as Khataman 
Nabiyeen.” Synopsis of Religious Preaching- Part II, n.d. 
http://www.alislam.org/library/links/khatam_ahmadi.html.  
7 World Directory of Minorities: Ahmadis of Pakistan http://www.faqs.org/minorities/South-
Asia/Ahmadis-of-Pakistan.html 
8 UNHCR Refworld: “Pakistan: Information on Ahmadis in Rabwah” 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acb76c.html 
9 “A Brief History of Ahmadiyya Movement In Islam.” 
http://www.alislam.org/library/history/ahmadiyya/65.html. 
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from “Rabwah” to “Chenab Nagar” on the plea that the word Rabwah is an Arabic word 
from the Quran and therefore blasphemous and illegal in nature according to the 
constitution.10 The resolution to change the town’s name is a violent act and is 
emblematic of a larger state-implemented project to fragment and reshape the Ahmadi 
identity to further solidify their exclusion socially, politically and constitutionally. As I 
will highlight briefly in the following section, the persecution of the Ahmadis has taken 
many forms.  
Overview of Ahmadi Persecution 
Since the birth of Pakistan in 1947, Ahmadis have been subject to severe and 
methodological persecution at the hands of religious extremists and the state and the 
conditions have worsened. The following section provides a brief overview of the scope 
of persecution and up-to-date human rights abuses towards the Ahmadi community in 
Pakistan. It will begin by highlighting the relevant laws and amendments that relate 
directly to the exclusion, particularly the Blasphemy laws. It will then discuss the nature 
of persecution in the realms of education, security business and anti-Ahmadi rallies and 
conferences.  
 Around 300 Ahmadis have been killed for their faith to date and countless have 
been kidnapped, been victims of attempted target-killings, accused of blasphemy, jailed 
and persecuted. Ahmadis in Pakistan have encountered decades of verbal, physical 
harassment, torture, and discrimination.11 Children as young as 5 to elderly members of 
the community have been jailed for cases of suspicion of blasphemy. Ahmadi students 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “Change of Name of Rabwah:  Persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.” 
https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/change-of-name-of-rabwah/. 
11 The Persecution of Ahmadis: List of Ahmadis Murdered for Their Faith” 
https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/list-of-ahmadis-murdered-for-their-faith/ 
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have been expelled and suspended from schools on the basis of their faith.12 Ahmadi 
businesses have been boycotted and are required to have a sign on their doors indicating 
Ahmadi ownership. Lists of names of Ahmadis are printed and distributed in almost 
every town calling for them to be tortured, killed, and raped since, as the clergies claim, 
these acts are permissible in Islam. Children are taught from an early age both at home 
and in schools that Ahmadis are worthy of such discrimination and hatred. In order to 
obtain citizenship and passports, Ahmadis must denounce their Muslim identity and their 
belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the Mahdi, or the Promised Messiah. Ahmadi graves 
are continuously desecrated.13 The word “Muslim” has been whited out of nearly every 
Ahmadi grave including the grave of Dr. Abdus Salam, an Ahmadi physicist and 
Pakistan’s first Nobel laureate.14 
 In recent years, the most significant event that took place was the May 2010 
Lahore attacks. On May 28th, 2010, two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore were sieged and 
attacked during Friday prayers by armed gunmen who were members of the Taliban. 
More than 80 people were killed and over a hundred were severely wounded. The 
Pakistani police force and army did very little to prevent or prosecute. The graves of 
those killed in this attack were desecrated in the following months.15 Last year, a brutal 
mob attack in a village in Gujranwala killed three female members, including two 
minors, injured a pregnant woman, which resulted in miscarriage, and burned down eight 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ebrahim, Zofeen T. “Ahmadis: The lightening rod that attracts the most hatred” dawn.com. October 28, 
2011. http://www.dawn.com/news/669566/ahmadis-the-lightning-rod-that-attracts-the-most-hatred 
13 Shackle, Samira. “The Mob Mentality that Prevents Things Improving for Minorities.” New Statesman. 
December 4, 2012. http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2012/12/mob-mentality-prevents-things-
improving-pakistans-minorities 
14 “Amidst Religious intolerance, Pakistan’s Nobel Laureate Fades Away.” Dawn News Pakistan. July, 30, 
2012. http://www.dawn.com/news/738366/amidst-religious-intolerance-pakistans-nobel-laureate-fades-
away  
15 Perlez, Jane. “Pakistani Taliban Carried Out Attack on Lahore Mosques, Police Say,” New York Times. 
May 29, 2010.  
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homes. The incident has yet to receive any attention from authorities or political 
figures.16  
Relevant Amendments and the Blasphemy Law 
 This section briefly describes some of the main laws and policies in the Pakistani 
law and constitution that are significant sources of the types of exclusion and persecution 
described in the sections after.   
In 1974, the second constitutional amendment was passed that officially declared 
Ahmadis non-Muslim by law. It specifically states that  
“(3) A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of 
The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets 
or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description 
whatsoever, after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a 
claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of 
the Constitution or law."17  
 
Furthermore, in 1984, Ordinance XX, or the “Blasphemy Laws,” were passed as an 
amendment to the Pakistan Penal Code under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, the 
then military dictator of Pakistan. It states specifically,  
“298B. Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages 
or places. 
(1) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ 
or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation;  
(a) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him),as ‘Ameerul Mumineen’, ‘Khalifa-tui-
Mumineen’, ‘Khalifa tul-Muslimeen’, ‘Sahaabi’ or ‘Razi Allah Anho’  
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him) as ‘Ummul-Mumineen’  
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-bait) of 
the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ‘Ahle-bait’; or  
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as ‘Masjid’;  
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
three years and shall also be liable to fine.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ahmad, Usman. “Pakistan’s Original Sin.” Foreign Policy. October, 10, 2014.  
http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/13/pakistans_original_sin 
17 LUMS. “1974 Constitutional Amendment” http://lums.edu.pk/remappingjustice/page.php/the-
second-amendment	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(2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or by 
any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, 
refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his faith as ‘Azan’ (call to 
prayer) or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
(3)  298C. Person of Quadiani group etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or 
propagating his faith. Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call 
themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself 
as Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or 
invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
three years and shall also be liable to fine.”18  
In addition to the Blasphemy law, Ordinance XV of the Pakistan Penal Code, 
articles 295, 295A and 298-A specifically discuss the offences relating to religion. 
Namely, this includes “injuring or defiling place of worship, with intent to insult the 
religion of any class,” “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious 
feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs,” and “Use of derogatory 
remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages.”19 Specifically, these laws prohibit Ahmadis 
to call themselves Muslims, call their mosques “masjids,” openly profess their faith, pray 
in public, write Quranic verses or Arabic on their buildings, and among many other 
prohibitions. The penalties for these crimes include fines, indefinite jail time, or even 
death. Upon activation of these laws under Zia, these laws penetrated beyond the legal 
system into the social arena, where individuals would take matters into their own hands, 
implementing mob rule, target killings, and proliferating wide-spread hate propaganda 
towards minority groups within nearly every realm of society. 
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Around 400 Ahmadis have been accused of blasphemy since these laws have been 
ordained.20 The abusive nature of the Blasphemy laws and other relevant laws in the PPC, 
allow for anyone to become an open target and Ahmadis as well as non-Ahmadis 
including Christians, Hindus and Muslims have been accused under faulty accusations, 
most predominately out of petty hostilities, political retribution or sheer discrimination. 
These laws override and obscure the potency of many of the fundamental rights listed in 
the Pakistani constitution, especially in regards to articles 20-22 concerning the freedom 
to profess any religion. The next few sections will provide a brief overview of the ways 
in which rights have been violated as a result of the permeability of the Blasphemy laws, 
the laws declaring Ahmadis outside the folds of mainstream Islam and the overall 
Islamicization project of the state. These factors have gravely affected the recognition 
and protection of countless rights of religious minorities, particularly the Ahmadis, and 
solidified their exclusion and isolation from public life.   
Education  
At a nationwide level, education has been a stifling and oppressive sphere for 
Ahmadi teachers and students of all ages. This section gives an overview of the scope of 
exclusion and discrimination in the educational system.  
Religious Islamic study or Islamiyat is mandatory in all state-run schools. This 
curriculum is devoid of any comparative study of sects within Islam and non-Muslim 
groups with a heavy focus on the mainstream Sunni narrative.21 
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21 US Department of State: “Office of International Religious Freedom Annual Report 2014” 
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The community members, both men and women, have historically always been 
high-achievers educationally and professionally following the emphasis of Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s teachings of jihad bil qalam, striving and succeeding through the pen in place 
of jihad of the sword. Despite the starkly repressive educational system, Ahmadis have 
struggled to outperform in all fields, only to be met by limited opportunities for 
employment and promotions in their post-educational careers.  
At a national level, especially in mixed neighborhoods and large cities, the 
educational system has worsened over the past few decades as Ahmadis students, once 
their identities are exposed, face bitter persecution in the classroom. Along with 
persistent harassment, Ahmadi students, both men and women, face complete isolation in 
the classroom, where they are completely ignored without even the option of class 
participation, suffer through frequent lectures targeting the community, risk expulsion 
and further harassment and receive death threats either directly or through text messages 
and social media platforms. They are the target of anti-Ahmadi student organizations that 
hold rallies, hand out leaflets and post boards and posters around campuses either 
targeting the community as a whole or individuals in the institution. These posters, 
leaflets and book stickers state things like “Qadianis (derogatory term for Ahmadis) are 
infidels, it is haraam to talk or deal with them,” “A complete boycott of Qadianis is the 
first sign of love for the Holy Prophet,” and “If your teacher is a Qadiani, refuse learning 
from him.”22  
Business 
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Many Ahmadi entrepreneurs and businessmen, both small and large-scale, have 
been targets of persecution and boycotting throughout Pakistan. This section briefly maps 
out areas in business where this has occurred.   
Over the last few years, Rabwah’s famous Gol Bazaar market has been subject to 
encroachments by illegal non-Ahmadi cart vendors from outside that residents say, have 
caused a number of issues including security, blockage of roads, competition and 
pollution. Outside of Rabwah in the large cities and mixed neighborhoods, there have 
been large-scale boycott movements towards Ahmadi businesses. For example, Shezan, a 
large mango juice business owned by Ahmadis has been boycotted. Most stores have 
posted signs on their doors indicating that they do not sell Ahmadi products or do 
business with Ahmadis for it is haraam, or forbidden.23 24   
      
Security 
Ahmadis living in mixed neighborhoods are far too frequently the target of 
violence and have been intimidated through harassment, killings, kidnappings, rape and 
expulsions for years. This section briefly summarizes the lack of security provided by the 
state and local authorities for the community, as they continuously remain targets.  
Students, Ahmadi mosques and businesses are all targets however, individuals in 
a marketplace or public space, for example, may also be targets based on their physical 
distinctions. It is interesting to note that while to the foreign eye, one may find that it is 
difficult to distinguish between the outward appearance of non-Ahmadis and Ahmadis on 	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a busy street, for example. However, there are in fact several physical markers that may 
be recognized, especially amongst the women. The Ahmadi style of burqa and niqab 
differs slightly to the non-Ahmadi style, the latter donning more Arabized styles whereas 
the Ahmadi burqas may resemble the kameez with slits on the side.  
While dependence on local and national authorities has become a futile means of 
ensuring security in mixed neighborhoods and large cities, especially given the lack of 
defense and prosecution in the Lahore mosque attacks of 2010 and the Gujranwala 
burnings in 2014, Rabwah, over the years, is becoming a far more insecure site as outside 
influences have been encroaching and gaining momentum in and around the town. Given 
the failures of the state to protect the community, the Ahmadis have resorted to 
developing and sustaining their own local community force comprised of volunteer 
members of the community and funded by the community in Pakistan and abroad. Armed 
local community guardsmen and screening checkpoints can be seen in front of and 
around all the major buildings and sites in Rabwah. However, as tensions heighten and 
martyrdoms increase, the local force is becoming less of a solution. In May 2014, two 
gunmen on motorcycles opened fire on Dr. Mehdi Ali Qamar, a visiting American 
cardiologist volunteering at Rabwah’s Fazle Umar hospital. The targeted killing took 
place early in the morning in front of the city’s Ahmadi graveyard Bahishti Maqbara 
while he was visiting the graves of loved ones with his wife and son.25 
This incident was met with great outcry from the community internationally not 
only because it targeted a foreign doctor, as prestigious and educated members of any 
group in question are often the objective of target killings, but it was also one of the 	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gravest incidences to have taken place within Rabwah’s boundaries. The killing provoked 
a heightened sense of insecurity and confirmed the notion that Rabwah is no longer a 
“safe haven.” Many have suggested that informants among the community security force 
disclosed information about Dr. Qamar’s visit and daily routine to help plan the attack, 
which has thus led to an amplified sense of distrust. 
Conferences 
Apart from the media, anti-hate sentiment is broadcasted widely through frequent 
anti-Ahmadi rallies throughout the year and in various parts of the country. Much like 
anti-Muslim rallies in the West, these rallies take similar shape and form and are greatly 
influential. This section briefly summarizes the scope of these rallies and their impact on 
the community.  
Large anti-Ahmadi conferences and rallies are frequently held throughout the 
year, attended by many key political figures of the Pakistan Muslim League and other 
political parties. The annual Khatam-e-Nubawat conferences that are held in and around 
Rabwah, often correspond to election season and seek to assert, remind and reaffirm the 
place of the Ahmadis in Pakistan and the Blasphemous nature of Ahmadi activities. 
These conferences, hosted by religious political parties Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-e-
Ulema-Islaami and their counterparts, feature long lists of resolutions and demands 
including the removal of Ahmadis from civil and public posts, changes to the national 
educational curriculum to feature the anti-Ahmadi stance, declaring the Ahmadi Youth 
Organization as a terrorist organization, and lengthy lists of businesses that ought to be 
boycotted. 26 	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These conferences that take place frequently throughout Pakistan, including large 
ones in Karachi and Lahore, composed of the dogmatic mob, exploitative political 
factions and the vocally and visibly powerful clergy, serve to each year fill in all of the 
gaps that followed the 1974 amendments and Zia’s policies. They serve to ensure that 
following each conference, no social, educational, political, economic facet be left 
overlooked vis-à-vis the “Ahmadi problem.” The use of religious processions and space 
as a display of hierarchal claim to public space is not an innovation of recent years but 
rather a huge part of South Asian history and have in the past led to many riots and 
massacres. They are now far more easily advertised and propagated through various 
media platforms. The nature of these processions correspond and link the social attitude 
of the masses directly to the policies and laws of the nation, as the resolutions and 
proposals made at these conferences greatly influence the proceeding lawmaking and rise 
in Blasphemy cases. The marriage of the mob with the law is indeed a dangerous union. 
These conferences are incredibly successful in not only rousing the social opinion and 
leading to mob attacks and growing discrimination but also enabling the fulfillment of 
these resolutions in the political arena and preserving the “purity” of Pakistan.27  
 
Section II: Secularism, Religion and National Identity 
In order to understand the way religion has played a role since Pakistan’s birth 
and understand the historical and political forces that have created the conditions towards 
the community as described in Section I, it is important to analyze three factors that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 




generated the Ahmadi question, namely, religion, national identity and law, especially 
through a historical perspective. In this section, I will be looking at the idea of “vision 
and division,” and analyze the visions of three of Pakistan’s main spokesmen- Jinnah, 
Iqbal and Maududi. I will examine how over time, through significant political and 
historical events, Jinnah’s Pakistan, which embodied the values of both the Muslim 
identity and secularism, had been diluted and Ahmadis found themselves at the receiving 
end of this dilution.  
It is important to begin to discuss issues of identity and the state and the role of 
religion related back to the contextual understanding of the starting point—the creation of 
Pakistan. To begin to understand the plight and the origins of persecution against 
Ahmadis in Pakistan, one must first consider the conditions in which the nation of 
Pakistan was formed during the 1947 Partition of India. Rogers Brubaker argues that the 
institutionalization of nationhood and nationality is part of a system of “vision and 
division,” and classification that is bred from conception, an idea and manifested into 
material realities in the creation of a state.28 I would like to examine these ideas further 
and discuss how the implications of religious boundary-making serve to consolidate 
power and political identity when a state is in its infancy and as the state develops over 
time. It is this very process of “vision and division” that had caused a shift from the 
balance of secularist and religious values embodied in Jinnah’s Pakistan and has 
politicized and used religion as a means of exclusion and control over identity.  
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Despite this shift, through a narration of three visions of Pakistan and a brief history of 
the nation, I will map out where and how secularism as a non-Western variant had 
manifested itself in different moments of time.   
Jinnah’s Pakistan 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and leader of the new Pakistan sovereign 
state expressed visions of Pakistan that were as Khan writes, “founded on consensual and 
pluralistic grounds, as a model of welfare, community, and popular sovereignty. He 
believed in the supremacy of the general will rather than of the religion of Islam per se.” 
In essence, the focal sense of Pakistani nationalism arose from a combination of these 
elements, including of course, the struggle for representation of elite minority Muslims as 
India decolonized. Nevertheless, all the justifications for Pakistan were encapsulated 
within a “Muslim identity” of pluralistic grounds and religious freedom. In his article 
Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International 
Law and International Relations, Amjad Mahmood Khan argues that not only was the 
Partition of India and the formation of Pakistan a means to solve purported Hindu-
Muslim conflicts, but it was also a way to gain and seek “political identity, empowerment 
and constitutionalism.”29 Yet, Jinnah’s Pakistan as he envisioned and the Pakistan of the 
Muslim League was what Khan described as “based on the primacy of the people; it was 
a non-sectarian, non-denominational, and purely Islamic ethos.”  
Alfred Stepan’s notion of twin tolerations may be used to understand Jinnah’s 
vision for Pakistan as a democracy based on the pluralistic values of Islam. The idea of 
“twin tolerations,” as Stepan describes, is “the minimal boundaries of freedom of action 	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that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-a-vis religious authorities, and 
for religious individuals and groups vis-a-vis political institutions.”30 Jinnah’s Pakistan 
seemed to embody this idea of balancing Islam in a new Muslim-majority homeland with 
both Islamic and secular values of democracy. Yet it has been contested if Jinnah had 
implied a secular-like state for Muslimhood from this address. From his speeches and 
writings, the Pakistan that Jinnah envisioned was a non-theocratic, secular democracy 
based on the Islamic values of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.”  
In his rendering of Charles Taylor’s three forms of Western trajectories of 
secularity—the “retreat of religion from the public sphere,” the “decline of religious 
beliefs and practices,” and “the extent of behavioral diversity,” Christophe Jaffrelot notes 
a fourth form of secularity, absent in Taylor’s framework—“religion as ideology,” as 
articulated by other theorists such as Ashish Nandy and Rajeev Bhargava.31 The idea of 
religion as ideology as a fourth form of secularism reflects the process of using religious 
language and the moral and truth content found in religious doctrine to uphold the rights 
of groups and individuals of the nation. It is the process of speaking through a religious 
moral ethos and using religious mediation to cultivate a state-implemented framework of 
rights and tolerance for all religious and minority groups. While Taylor’s three forms of 
secularism illustrate the West’s trajectory with religion in the state as retreating from the 
public sphere, this fourth form of secularity seen in India, as Bhargava explores, and in 
Pakistan at different moments in its history are important to understand religion as an 
ideology, as a form of modern secularism and national identity. Essentially, it is the idea 	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of not removing religion from the table when discussing the traditional view of 
secularism but rather it is keeping it at the forefront and using religion to mediate 
solutions and formulate repair. Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan exemplifies this fourth 
secularity. It shows the progressive struggle to find a balance between the state and 
religion as an ideology, as a cultural driver of identity and as a pluralistic value system 
that seeks to enrich and accommodate rather than either remove religion altogether or 
permeate religion into the state into theocratic and authoritarian ways. Jinnah’s vision, the 
subsequent Objectives Resolution under Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first prime 
minister, and the small but strengthening secularization efforts born out of decades of 
frustration in Pakistan today embody the fourth secularity. To understand Jinnah’s vision 
with regards to religion as an ideology, it is best to examine Jinnah’s own words. In an 
address from February 1948, Jinnah said,  
“I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I 
am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of 
Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1300 years ago. 
Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, 
justice and fairly play to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious 
traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of 
the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a 
theocratic State -- to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many 
non- Muslims -- Hindus, Christians, and Parsis -- but they are all Pakistanis. 
They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play 
their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.” 32 
 
Jinnah frequently emphasized toleration and accommodation in the new Muslim 
homeland for religious minorities. At his famous address at the Karachi Club on August 
11th, 1947, Jinnah said,  
“If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you . . . is 
first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and 	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obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. We should begin 
to work in that spirit, and in the course all these angularities of the majority and 
minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—
because even as regard to Muslim you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis, and 
so on—will vanish. To my mind, this problem of religious differences has been 
the greatest hindrance in the progress of India. Therefore, we must learn a lesson 
from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to 
your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You 
may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the 
business of the State.”33 
 
Not only did Jinnah emphasize the role of equal citizenship for all minorities, he 
repeatedly expressed particular concern for the position of the Ahmadis in the new 
Muslim homeland, while others had long been advocating for their exclusion from both 
the Muslim community in India, specifically the All-India Muslim League as well as 
from the new nation as a whole. At a press conference in Kashmir in January 1988, 
Jinnah responded to the Ahmadi question in regards to the All-India Muslim League 
(AIML) by stating,  
“…as far as the constitution of the All-India Muslim League is concerned, it 
stipulates that any Muslim, without distinction of creed or sect, can become a 
member, provided he accepts the views, policy and programme of the Muslim 
League, signs the form of membership and pays the subscription.”34 
 
When asked further about his views on Ahmadi Muslimness, he responded by 
saying, “What right have I to declare a person non-Muslim, when he claims to be a 
Muslim.” Furthermore, at an address in May 1944, Jinnah said, “Ahmadis are Muslims, if 
they say they are Muslims and no one, not even the sovereign legislature, has the right to 
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Sociologist Sadia Saeed notes how at this time, the Ahmadi Jamaat (community) 
probed their belonging in either the Congress or the AIML given their religious status and 
the AIML’s definition of Muslim membership and wrote to Jinnah regarding this 
question. While Jinnah’s response merely indicated the change in leadership from 
Provincial to District Level leagues, and that “it is for you to adopt such course as you 
may consider proper,” Liaqat Ali Khan, when approached by the Ahmadi Jamaat with the 
same question responded with nuanced sarcasm by reiterating that it was up to the 
Ahmadi Jamaat’s will and the religious status of the community according to the Ahrari 
ulema.36 These correspondences and clear distancing of Liaqat Ali Khan from the 
community in regards to their place in the AIML exhibit a different realm beyond the 
seemingly promising words of Jinnah with regards to the Ahmadis. 
Maududi’s Pakistan 
  While Jinnah’s charismatic words embodying a pluralistic Muslim state seem 
unfathomable given the status of the Ahmadis presently, Jinnah had not been the sole 
spokesperson and force behind the vision of Pakistan. At the time of the birth of the new 
nation of Pakistan, there was a lack of a clear consensus on what the role of Islam would 
be in this new state. It is important to note Brubaker’s idea of “vision and division” in the 
process of nation-making here. While the motive for those who agreed on a Muslim 
homeland separate from India had been relatively uniform, there were multiple visions of 
how a future Pakistan and Pakistani identity would materialize, and the question of the 	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place of the Ahmadis served as a strong catalyst for determining the role of Islam in the 
future homeland. Pakistani philosopher and leader of Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-
Islaami Abdul Ala Maududi was an incredibly influential Islamist leader not only in 
Pakistan but his novel ideas on political Islam resonated greatly with former leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups as well. Maududi was a staunch 
follower of Wahabbi- Sunni Islam and he opposed secularization. He was also a strong 
voice in propelling the anti-Ahmadi movement.  
Maududi’s ideas on Islam’s role in the new state and the particular attention given 
to the Ahmadi question played a huge role in the crafting of the new nation. The language 
and ideas that were being negotiated at this moment in Pakistan sought to both 
understand and publicly disseminate what the role of Islam and the position of the 
Ahmadis would be. While Jinnah’s vision had been a pluralistic one based on both 
frameworks of secularism and the democratic and tolerant values of Islam, the driving 
forces were most certainly the more stringent religious parties, in particular Maududi’s 
influential Jamaat-e Islam (JI) and other political figures who spoke with greater volume 
and long-term influence on the shaping of Pakistan as an Islamic state, and embarked on 
the claim to Pakistan, especially after Jinnah’s death a year after the creation of the new 
state.    
Conservative religious clergy and political parties, like JI and Jamiat-Ulema-e-
Islam, although they opposed the Muslim League and a separate Muslim state initially, 
they did not fail to quickly define that this Muslim homeland/ Islamic state would entail a 
strict and rigid Wahabbi-informed political Islam. It was through this vision that the 
Muslimness of the Pakistani identity had been outlined and the exclusion and inclusion 
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along solid lines of restricted citizenship had been drawn.  
After Jinnah died in 1948, under the weaker leadership of Liaqat Ali-Khan, the JI 
and its counterparts found a more accessible platform. Ayesha Jalal writes: “[t]he great 
constitutionalist could not have conceived that the country he had established would 
honor his legacy by turning law into an instrument of denial for the underprivileged and a 
tool to be manipulated for personal ends.”37 The Jamaat-e-Islaami, along with other 
conservative religio-political groupings such as the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, a militant 
organization formed in 1931, through rallies and processions throughout Punjab, vocally 
propagated in 1949 the demand to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslim and remove all 
Ahmadis from official posts especially Chaudhary Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, 
Pakistan’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, appointed by Jinnah. The Ahrar anti-Ahmadi 
movement intersected with the drafting of the Objectives Resolution under Liaqat Ali 
Khan, a preamble to the Constitution that shifted away from the secular-like state Jinnah 
had envisioned to the incorporation of Islam in some key regards. Ayesha Jalal writes, 
“[t]his was the opening religio-political groups seized to claim authenticity for their own 
brand of Islam, bristling with exclusivist, chauvinistic, and misogynistic social values.”38 
Despite this shift from Jinnah’s vision and the growing demands of movements such as 
the Ahrar, the state had maintained the protection of the fundamental rights of all 
minorities in the earlier decades of the new nation39  
Iqbal’s Pakistan 
Writer, philosopher and founding father Allama Iqbal also played an immense 
role in defining the Pakistani cause and characterizing the lines of exclusion and 	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inclusion vis-à-vis the Ahmadis. Ali Usman Qasmi argues that Iqbal was particularly 
effective because his anti-Ahmadi approach juxtaposed with that of the mullahs, or the 
religious clergy. While the mullahs were seen as semi-educated and counter-progressive, 
effective insofar as the mobilization of a certain class of the population, Iqbal sought 
influence among the political elite that was oriented towards Islamic modernism and 
within its lexicon, Iqbal was able to remove the Ahmadis from the Islamic and Muslim 
identity and considered them non-Muslim. Qasmi writes, “[t]hrough the intermediary of 
Iqbal, the infeasibility of the mullah’s vision for Pakistan was given further ideological 
justification.”40  
Iqbal’s famous exchange with Jawaharal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India 
and one of the founding fathers of India, before the Partition further expounded on the 
Ahmadi issue as a problem that the Indian Muslim community needed to resolve before 
attempting to create a new Muslim state. When Nehru asked Iqbal and the Indian Muslim 
community of the status of the Ahmadis and the overall “reactionary conservative” nature 
of the Muslims, Iqbal responded with his note, Islam and Ahmadism, in which he 
emphasized that the construction of the Islamic state would begin with separating the 
Ahmadis from the larger Indian Muslim community, which allowed for a reinforcement 
of a more conservative form of Islam embedded within the system of the new state and 
not the Islamically plural and secular state that Jinnah had envisioned. Iqbal was vocal in 
his criticism towards the Ahmadi community in India and the idea of a secular state but 
moreover, he was an influential critic of democracy as a Grecian-Western democracy 
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based on capitalist greed and imperialism.41 Iqbal’s vision for an Islamic state and his 
ideals on Western democracy, although they paralleled the views of Maududi and other 
“mullah,” or religious clergy figures, Iqbal was able to leverage far greater support for his 
views because of his charismatic and intellectual approach to the questions the pioneers 
for the new nation had been grappling with.   
The Dilution of Jinnah’s Vision  
When a nation is founded on such schizophrenic foundations with regards to the 
role of religion and the state, the subsequent trajectory of identity-crafting greatly 
depends on which vision monopolizes most successfully. The dilution of Jinnah’s 
secular-like, pluralistic vision of Pakistan and the conglomeration and influence of 
visions of an Islamic Pakistan paved the way for the next few decades which sought to 
define Pakistan, arguably, for its inherent purpose as a politicized Islamic state as 
envisioned by Maududi and Iqbal. It was during the regimes of leader and political 
entrepreneur Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 70s and military dictator Zia-ul-Haq in the 80s 
that solidified the Islamization/Sunnization project and successfully established 
constitutional laws and policies explicitly excluding the Ahmadis. It was during Bhutto 
and Zia’s regimes in the 70s and 80s that the Blasphemy laws were reestablished and 
strengthened.  
 The next few decades would witness the growing influence of militant jihadist 
movements, the irreversible impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. 
support for the anti-communist mujahideen mission, Bhutto and Zia’s 
Wahabbization/Islamization, the rising extremism following 9/11 and the West “War on 	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Terror,” and the breakdown of the possibility of Jinnah’s pluralistic secular state that 
embodied Islamic ethos. The fluctuation of military versus civilian rule would 
periodically stunt democratic growth and contribute to the ongoing struggle for a stable 
democracy that exists today. Mullahs rose to power through widespread influence in the 
social and political realms and allowed for the re-establishing of Pakistan as truly a “Land 
of the Pure,” in the eyes of religious fundamentalists and Islamic parties.  
From Pakistan’s conception, this hegemonic influence was the beginning of a re-
shaping of a “Pure”-istan (“Pak”= pure) by seeking out what was deemed as un-Islamic 
and “impure.” Maududi’s JI grew in power as an important pressure group. Ahmadis 
were targeted as Wajibul Qatal, or “worthy of killing,” due to the level of threat they 
posed for the majority Sunni Muslim identity. Pakistan’s clergy continued to vocally 
declare Ahmadis apostates and deserving of death as rallies, processions and conferences 
strengthened. Saeed argues that the plight of the Ahmadis took full form during and 
following the Bhutto regime and that Pakistan’s relationship to the Ahmadis manifested 
in three phases: the moment of accommodation during the first three decades, followed 
by the moment of exclusion during Bhutto’s regime and finally, moment of 
criminalization, during Zia’s regime and onward.42 
The 1956 Constitution declared Pakistan as an Islamic Republic and that the Head 
of State must be a Muslim along with adopting the provisions of the Objectives 
Resolution. This system with the adoption of the Objectives Resolution can be conceived 
as fitting one of Alfred Stepan’s models of the Varieties of Democratic Patterns of 
Religious-State Relations. Stepan describes the “Nonsecular, but Friendly to Democracy” 
model as having an established church and official religion that, apart from the Muslim 	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appointment of the Head of State, is “accorded no constitutional prerogatives to mandate 
significant policies, and all “religious groups can compete for power in political 
society.”43 However, many cite the Objectives Resolution as the first step following 
Jinnah’s death that opened the future trajectory of the Islamization project, establishing 
Islam as the state religion but not yet a theocracy. Nonetheless, the Objectives Resolution 
maintained several fundamental rights including religious freedom and minority rights 
and protections. This model is listed under ‘relatively stable patterns,” and during first 
several years of the new state under the Objectives Resolution, this model did provide 
temporary stability balancing both Islamic and secular foundations of democracy as 
Ahmadis and other minorities enjoyed a certain degree of accommodation and political 
mobilization, despite pressures from the far right and even after the death of Jinnah.   
Had the subsequent series of politically expedient leaderships, and the damaging 
nature of the relationships with the Gulf and the United States not surfaced, the potential 
stability and balance between Islam and the state and the balance between the multiple 
visions that the Objectives Resolution guaranteed may not have been eroded. The 
irreversibility of the erosion of Jinnah’s secular-like state  manifested during this time, 
with its reparations still being felt today. The establishment and strengthening of the 
Blasphemy laws in the 70s and 80s significantly triggered this erosion and the 
persecution of the Ahmadis. As I had outlined earlier in the paper, while the current 
Constitution derived from the Objectives Resolution guarantees several fundamental 
rights in Part II, Articles 8-28 with regards to religious freedom, the Blasphemy laws and 
the impact they have had on the protection of religious minorities outweigh and counter 
those constitutional rights.   	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Given the scope, infiltration and nature of political Islam in Pakistan, one that is 
paired with staunch nationalism and a product of so many different external and internal 
political factors, what can be understood in terms of secularism and the struggle for 
repair? How can we begin to address this struggle in view of the rights of Ahmadis and 
other groups and also have a deep understanding of the way in which Islam functions in 
Pakistan? Because this issue deals directly with religion and the state, is the Western 
understanding of secularization as separating religion from the state a problematic 
process for repair or can secularism be understood in a language that is different from the 
inadequate language of the West? Using Jinnah’s vision as a starting point, what can be 
understood about rights, religion and the state that acknowledges the negotiation of 
religion rather than the negation of religion? Despite the trajectory of exclusion that has 
manifested itself in Pakistan especially during the 70s and onward, the struggle for repair 
still remains and Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan can still be considered relevant.  
In the following section, I will attempt to unearth a non-Western variant of 
secularism using the example of Pakistan that is better suited to address these issues than 
traditional Western understandings of secularism. It is easy to simply conclude that 
Pakistan has no hope with these issues given the dominating trajectory that political Islam 
has taken in Pakistan. I am addressing this failure—the lack of rights for Ahmadis, the 
failure of the state to protect them, the worsening of conditions, and the strengthening of 
nationalism all amounting to the sheer difficulty of repair. With an acknowledgment of 
these issues, I am then arguing that the solution or approaches to a solution cannot be to 
simply secularize in the Western understanding of secularism. Starting with small steps 
and nuances it is necessary to understand how religion works in Pakistan, understand 
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where and how tolerance can be inserted and how "secularism" can take shape outside of 
the West. It is this framework that ought to be kept in mind when approaching the 
Ahmadi issue today and formulating solutions. 
 
Section III: Unearthing a non-Western Variant of Secularism 
Negotiation not Negation 
Historian Ayesha Jalal stated that, “[s]ecularism does not mean negation of 
religion, and therefore Jinnah was consistent in his approach.”44 In this section, I will 
unpack secularism in its traditional Western understanding and discuss the features of a 
non-Western variant of secularism. I will then explore ways in which ways this variant of 
secularism has been attempted in Pakistan. I will then assess a few key templates and 
examples in the Islamic world where states have exhibited a pluralistic balance of 
tolerance and religious ethos.  
The traditional definition of secularism calls for the removal of religion from all 
aspects of the public sphere, most notably adopted by theorists such as John Rawls. It is 
traditionally believed to be a product of modernism and the retreat of religion from public 
space as science and modernity advance. Freedom, liberty and fraternity are the 
traditional features of secularism, in the terms developed from the French Revolution. 
This is a view of secularism that has shown to be incredibly insular and problematic. 
Post-secularists have begun to engage with the acknowledgement that religion cannot be 
simply taken out of the public sphere but rather it must be addressed and given some 	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context and space as long as it does not impede the systems of the modern state. Perhaps 
post-secularism may be a better model through which secularism in Pakistan, however 
fragmented, may be approached; yet still, this process requires an unpacking of the Euro-
hyper-reality of the concepts in order to better understand their application in the non-
West. As I mentioned before, Charles Taylor has sought to understand secularism 
through three forms, "as that which is retreating in public space (1), or as a type of belief 
and practice which is or is not in regression (2), and as a certain kind of belief or 
commitment whose conditions in this age are being examined (3) (A Secular Age, 
p. 15).” Although Taylor writes from a post-secularist lens, it is important to note the 
difficulty in applying any of these three renderings of secularism to Pakistan or anywhere 
in the non-West. Jaffrelot suggests a fourth secularity applicable to the non-West that 
registers religion as ideology, as I had discussed earlier. Others including Rajeev 
Bhargava have also sought to explain secularism in view of religion as ideology in the 
non-West as distinct and used their respective examples to highlight this. Bhargava 
engages particularly with Indian distinctiveness. He writes,  
“Ideals are rarely if ever and never simply transplanted from one cultural context to 
another. They invariably adapt, sometimes so creatively to suit their new habitat that they 
seem unrecognizable. This is exactly what happened to secularism in India. Indian critics 
of secularism neither fully grasp the general conceptual structure of secularism nor 
properly understand its distinctive Indian variant. Indian secularism did not erect a strict 
wall of separation, but proposed instead a ‘principled distance’ between religion and 
state. Moreover, by balancing the claims of individuals and religious communities, it 
never intended a bludgeoning privatization of religion. It also embodies a model of 
contextual moral reasoning. All these features that combine to form what I call contextual 
secularism remain screened off from the understanding of these critics.” 45 
 
The ‘principled distance’ Bhargava proposes is an important starting point in 
understanding the attempt at a functioning balance between religious ideology and state 	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protections of rights through, for example, Jinnah’s Pakistan and the subsequent period of 
accommodation in the first few decades following Pakistan’s birth. Examining these 
concepts and distinct secularisms of the non-West, and applying them to the case of 
Pakistan is an important starting point in recapturing the balance between religion and the 
state as Jinnah had proposed. As described earlier in the narration of his vision, Jinnah’s 
vision had been a balance of both the rights and pluralism in Islam and the rights in the 
universal human rights system with regards to protection of minorities.  Therefore, his 
vision is an example of a distinct secularism exclusive to Pakistan. Jinnah spoke from an 
Islamic ethos, emphasized the rights and protections of minorities and religious freedom 
inherent in the Islamic doctrine and in this way demonstrated the potential for a 
‘principled distance,’ as Bhargava describes.  
With regards to rights, voices like Jinnah’s have emphasized the Islamic doctrine 
of huququl ibaad, translated literally as the rights of man. Inherent in Islam is an entire 
system of human rights that obligate believers to fulfill these rights and duties to their 
fellow mankind. These rights include providing for the poor, protecting the weak from 
oppression and abuse, justice, freedom of belief, protecting others from one’s own “hands 
and tongue,” the rights of orphans, the rights of women, the rights of the elderly, the 
rights of the ill, freedom of slaves, the rights of the child, and a respect and promotion of 
human dignity.46 The Quranic doctrine that states “there is no compulsion in religion,” 
categorically rejects coercion in the name of religion in all aspects of social life. This is 
the language to use in order to address both religion and rights in Pakistan. As I had 
described earlier, the Constitution of Pakistan parallels many of these rights and ensures 
state protection of these rights as stated in Section II, Chapter 2, Article 36 that “the State 	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shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due 
representation in the Federal and Provincial services.”47 	  
Sociologist Jurgen Habermas, in his post-secularist understanding of religious 
culture, identity and “multiple modernities,” best encapsulates the necessary negotiation 
process required in sites like Pakistan, where religious moral ethos is the truth content 
with which rights are understood. In his discussion of negotiating religion in the public 
sphere, Habermas writes, “[r]eligious traditions have a special power to articulate moral 
intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. In the event of 
the corresponding political debates, this potential makes religious speech a serious 
candidate to transporting possible truth contents, which can then be translated from the 
vocabulary of a particular religious community into a generally accessible language.”48 
 An emphasis on these particular truth contents, despite the conflict that manifests 
from other, more hegemonic truth contents, is an important starting point in 
understanding the functionality and potential of religious worldviews as a whole. Inherent 
in the religion are rights and an emphasis on justice—the problem lies in mapping out 
where and how religion became distorted, manipulated and politicized to override these 
tenets that speak of tolerance. Even a discussion on the Blasphemy Laws, a set of laws in 
the Pakistan penal codes adopted not from the religion itself but from colonial British 
India will demonstrate the sheer distance of the Islamic doctrine and the politicization of 
these laws. Many laws in the Islamic doctrine, which had been founded in order to reduce 
conflict rather than to exacerbate, require a meticulous system of witness validation and 	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genuine proof before any prosecution can be formulated.  
This is not the case with the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan. The latter have simply 
become a tool through which petty conflicts are channeled and exclusion and hate are 
solidified. What this contrast speaks to is the potential of understanding and the language 
from within that can be used to mobilize and call for change, albeit this change may be 
incredibly gradual and distant and requires incredible nuance. It is not secularism in the 
Western understanding of separation and negation, but secularism as a balance and 
negotiation and as an umbrella term for tolerance, rights and justice inherent in the faith 
as truth contents that can be potentially delivered to those who believe and those who rule 
the state. While the Constitution explicitly grants freedom of religion and specific 
safeguards regarding religious discrimination, the Blasphemy Laws of the Penal Codes 
meticulously outline restrictions on the Ahmadi faith on nearly all facets of Ahmadi 
social, political and public life. In order to begin dismantling the potency given to the 
Blasphemy Laws, the rights inherent in Islam, the rights enshrined in the Constitution and 
the pluralistic balance Jinnah envisioned for the nation of Pakistan must rematerialize.   
Reversing the Irreversible: Pakistan’s Attempts at Repair 
Despite the forceful trajectory of Wahabbism and nationalism, especially seen 
following the leaderships of Bhutto and Zia, a few attempts have been made to counter 
these processes and a few continue to strive to do this even today. Several grassroots 
human rights movements and politicians have vocalized their criticism of the Blasphemy 
Laws as having no place in Islam nor in the Pakistani constitution, which grants several 
fundamental rights as I have discussed. Political attempts of unearthing secularism in its 
Pakistani variant made by the leaderships of Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf tried 
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but failed to succeed, not just because of hostilities from the anti-secular far right and 
Islamist parties but because of a breadth of other political reasons and problems external 
to this debate that weakened their potential.  
Benazir Bhutto, the first female Muslim prime minister who ruled Pakistan for 
two terms in the late 80s and early 90s had attempted to unearth the balance conceived by 
Jinnah by attempting to promote secularism and democracy while speaking from an 
Islamic ethos. In her book, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West, Bhutto 
wrote, “[d]emocracy was a consensus emerging from the free expression of the will of 
the small community as well as the implementation of Quranic ideals that we know to be 
intrinsic to democratic society: tolerance, pluralism, justice, law, equality and a fair 
economic system.”49 During her term, Bhutto particularly attempted to address women’s 
issues dealing with stringent laws as well as internal ethnic tensions. However, despite 
being seen as a leader promoting secularism, her legacy has been fraught with 
convictions of corruption, political entrepreneurship much like that of her father, and 
convictions of indirect political recognition of the Taliban in Afghanistan.50 If these 
external political factors and inconsistencies had not tainted her leadership, her emphasis 
on promoting secularism as a Pakistani variant may have proved a bit more successful.  
Similarly, military dictator Pervez Musharraf, who ruled in the early 2000s had 
attempted to promote a secularism based on Islamic ethos, which he entitled the 
“Enlightened Moderation.” Addressing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an 
international organization of 57 member states in the Muslim world, in 2004 he stated,  
“I say to my brother Muslims: The time for renaissance has come. The way forward is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Reconciliation, Bhutto. P 73 
50 NBC News “Bhutto blames Taliban, al Qaida for explosions” Oct 19 2007 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21374344/ 
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through enlightenment. We must concentrate on human resource development through 
the alleviation of poverty and through education, health care and social justice. If this is 
our direction, it cannot be achieved through confrontation. We must adopt a path of 
moderation and a conciliatory approach to fight the common belief that Islam is a religion 
of militancy in conflict with modernization, democracy and secularism.”51 
   
This strategy, like that of Bhutto’s, embodies religion as ideology, the fourth 
secularity Jaffrelot had proposed in its rendering of secularism, much like that of 
Jinnah’s. It holds the potential for a Pakistani variant of secularism that speaks from an 
Islamic ethos and does not see Islam, secularism and democracy as incompatible. 
However, like Bhutto’s promotion of secularism, Musharraf’s legacy has been filled with 
criticisms and inconsistencies diluting any possible actualization of his project. 
Musharraf has been, after all, a military dictator and head of an army that fueled the 
Islamization process under former military dictator Zia. Musharraf has also been 
criticized greatly for his relationship with the US and George Bush’s “War on Terror,” 
which significantly empowered extremism and resistance. He has also been reluctant to 
address issues such as the Blasphemy Laws, saying that it is a sensitive issue in Pakistan 
and cannot and should not be changed.52   
Despite this, those proposals have been built upon the skeleton of Jinnah’s vision 
in an attempt to unearth the possibility of a balance between religious authority and ideals 
and state implementation of rights—rights that are, as described above, not alien to the 
Pakistani constitution or even to the Islamic worldview. It is problematic to view the 
Pakistani state, the Pakistani people and the religion of Islam as monolithic entities that 
are static and absolutely resistant to change despite the seemingly irreversible trajectory 	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with regards to rights and particularly the Ahmadis.  
 
Islamic Empire, State and Tolerance 
There has been a lack of adequate study and focus on moments in history where 
Islam and tolerance was exhibited and worked in conjunction with the state to recognize 
rights of groups and individuals. In this section, I will explore the process of unearthing a 
non-Western variant of secularism and tolerance with particular regards to Islam and 
pluralism in other parts of the Islamic world. It may be useful to examine a few key 
models of both Islamic empire and the modern state as templates for Pakistan. In 
discussing empire, I will briefly discuss the Ottoman Empire and the ways in which 
moments of coexistence and distribution of religious rights not only emulated Islamic 
ethos but also benefitted the state. Similarly, the modern states of Indonesia and Senegal, 
both of which have a few contextual parallels to the modern state of Pakistan are key 
templates that can be examined to understand Islam, tolerance and the state and a non-
Western variant of secularism. It is through these templates that we can examine the 
functionality of Islam and the state and begin to discuss nuanced solutions for inserting 
tolerance in the Pakistani case.  
In her essay, Empire and Toleration, sociologist Karen Barkey examines 
toleration in the Ottoman Empire and argues that all societies both persecute and tolerate. 
However, much focus is allotted exclusively to moments of intolerance, especially in the 
non-West, and moments of tolerance are often overlooked. Similarly, when examining 
Pakistan, it is incredibly easy to map out the growing intolerance in Pakistan’s recent 
history. However, it is important to reexamine moments of potential tolerance in 
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Pakistan’s history such as Jinnah’s vision and the earlier periods of accommodation by 
the Pakistani state. More generally, it is also crucial to examine moments of tolerance in 
Islamic history of other nation-states and empires to reflect possibilities for the future of 
Pakistan.   
In the case of the Ottoman Empire, Barkey discusses the systematic moments of 
pluralism and tolerance during the rule that reflected similar visions of accommodation of 
a diverse society ruled by Muslim leaders. Fundamentally, the Ottoman Empire 
propagated and ruled through a pluralistic Islam and as Barkey argues, moments of 
intolerance were mostly paired with economic competition rather than religious 
hostilities. In periods of accommodation, non-Muslims, or dhimmis, were granted extra 
protections listed in a set of several religious rights and freedoms, a system based on the 
early Islamic model of diverse rule known as the Pact of Umar. Under the millet system, 
despite the ruling Islamic law of the state, non-Muslims and others were allowed to 
practice their own personal laws in lieu of the overarching Muslim law. As Barkey 
argues, this system had been successful in propagating tolerance through an Islamic 
system for centuries and moments of intolerance were distinctly correlated with external 
political and economic hostilities and changing contexts. 53 The millet system of the 
Ottoman Empire offers a template of a state that demonstrated the propagation of 
tolerance through an emphasis on group rights more so than individual rights.  
In regards to the modern state, much attention is given to the failures of tolerance 
in the Islamic world and the incompatibility of secularism and democracy with Islam. 
Much of this focus is primarily on the Arab world and thus the correlation between 	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Arabism and Islam is often erroneously highlighted. Pakistan, a nation that has been 
largely influenced by the Saudi regime over time, is also subject to this attention. 
However, when looking at the examples of Indonesia and Senegal, it may be argued that 
these provide a distinct template for a non-Western variant of secularism of Muslim-
majority societies and that these templates ought to be examined when identifying 
differences and working towards solutions. Alfred Stepan highlights some of the ways in 
which Senegal and Indonesia have been relatively more plural, diverse and given the 
extent of the balance between Islamic ethos and secularism in these countries, Stepan 
highlights where his conception of “twin tolerations” has been more applicable.  
It is interesting to note that Indonesia and Pakistan both gained independence in 
the same decade and during their infancies, at the time of constructing the new nations, 
similar conversations about the role of religion in the state were taken place. Like 
Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan, during the developing stages of Indonesia’s constitution, 
there had been visions that called for pluralism and secularism in light of the Islamic 
ethos. Over time, despite pressures from the far right conservative Islamist parties calling 
for stricter implementation of Islamic law, voicing similar visions like that of Pakistan’s 
process of “vision and division” propagated by Maududi and Iqbal, Indonesia maintained 
its original structural balance of religion and the state.  
Today, while it is erroneous to overlook Indonesia’s own trajectory of intolerance, 
especially in regards to the Ahmadis, the Indonesian state, as Stepan argues, still provides 
a strong structure for the balance of twin tolerations and a negotiation of rights from 
within an Islamic framework. Earlier this year, under the new leadership of president 
Joko Widodo, a draft law was proposed before the government by the Ministry of 
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Religion that calls for the protection of all religious minorities, “including those outside 
the six major religions (Islam, Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism and 
Protestantism).”54 Despite the many issues involving the treatment of minorities in 
Indonesia, this is a major step by the Indonesian state that demonstrates growth towards 
the recognition of rights, a template that Pakistan can and should gradually come to 
model.  
Likewise in Senegal, Stepan notes the state practice and implementation of 
religion to generally follow the Islamic principle of “no compulsion in religion.” He notes 
that in regards to human rights abuses, such as female genital mutilation, Senegal has 
seen that projects initiated by both the state and human rights NGOs aimed to counter this 
cultural practice were far more successful when authoritative religious leaders vocalized 
the argument that there is no evidence within the Islamic doctrine or tradition to support 
the practice. The religious leaders in this case emphasized the language of individual 
rights inherent in Islamic doctrine that opposes the destruction of an individual’s human 
dignity and the oppression of women. The dissemination of religious truth content that 
indicates moral ethos from within the religion such as in the example of campaigns 
against FGM in Senegal should be seen as an important ingredient to secularism in the 
non-West. This is the negotiation of religious language and moral intuition in the public 
sphere that Habermas had discussed. In the case of Pakistan, not only can the Islamic 
moral ethos be highlighted in what Jinnah had envisioned and what is inherent in Islam 
itself, but in specific regards to blasphemy established in Pakistan under the British penal 
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code. The moral truth content that ought to be disseminated is how far removed the 
concept of blasphemy and its punishment is in the Islamic doctrine and tradition itself, 
much like the cultural practice of FGM. In both the Quran and the Prophethood, there are 
countless examples that counter the validity of blasphemy and its punishment.55 It is the 
gradual process of unearthing and negotiating moral intuition from religious truth content 
in the public sphere that gives secularism in the non-West its distinctiveness. It is only 
through this process that a nation like Pakistan can gradually begin to discuss repair and 
work towards nuanced solutions of the violation of rights towards the Ahmadis and other 
religious minorities.  
Reassessing Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws 
After unpacking the dynamics of Pakistan’s political history with regards to 
religion, the templates of toleration and rights in Islamic doctrine and history and most 
importantly, the crucial ingredients of secularism in the non-West that demonstrates 
religion as ideology, how can we begin to discuss nuanced solutions for Pakistan’s 
Blasphemy laws? In this final section, I will be focusing on Pakistan’s Blasphemy laws 
and discussing gradual solutions that take all of the above elements into consideration. 
Given the difficulty of repair, it is problematic to arrive at two propositions: to either 
remove the blasphemy laws in their entirety and attempt to secularize Pakistan in the 
Western understanding of secularism or render Pakistan as a failed state and offer no 
systematic solutions for the future. I argue that despite the difficulty of repair, Pakistan 
may move towards gradual change through a nuanced approach towards the Blasphemy 
Laws and a re-recognition of individual and group rights already inherent in both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Pakistani and Islamic foundations.  
As I had discussed earlier in the paper, many individual and group rights are 
enshrined in the Pakistani Constitution including security, the right to be free from 
arbitrary arrest, the right to a fair trial, the right not to be subject to forced labor, the right 
to be free from torture, freedom of movement and assembly, freedom of business, the 
right to freedom of speech, the right to information, freedom of religion, safeguards 
against taxation towards any specific religion, safeguards in educational institutions with 
regards to religion, right to education, non-discrimination in public places and property 
rights. These are rights that have been enshrined in the constitution since the birth of 
Pakistan and are comprehensive in addressing both individual and groups rights. 
However, as I have demonstrated, Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, a set of laws in the 
Pakistani Penal Code have overridden and overpowered the weight of the rights in the 
constitution. The State has a responsibility to recognize and protect the rights of 
minorities and individuals in accordance to the rights in the constitution as well as rights 
in the Islamic doctrine and counteract the weight that has been given to the Blasphemy 
laws in the past few decades.  
Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan demonstrates the balance of Islamic moral ethos and 
state duty to protect individual and group rights. In order to begin to dismantle the weight 
of the Blasphemy laws, Pakistan must reassess Jinnah’s vision and address the duty of the 
state to protect and empower religious minorities and individuals from these minority 
groups. As I had addressed earlier, Jinnah spoke from an Islamic ethos and emphasized 
the rights inherent in Islam.  
The example of Senegal demonstrates how the state is using religious mediation 
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to address individual rights within local communities with regards to FGM. Using this 
template and applying it towards the case of Pakistan and Blasphemy, the state ought to 
establish systematic mediation projects in conjunction with religious leaders to address 
the scope of human dignity and Islam’s opposition to oppression against minorities and 
individuals and reevaluate the concept of Blasphemy as un-Islamic. This may be done 
through serious monitoring of the nation’s many madrassas or religious schools and 
state-run implementation of tolerance training courses in the curriculum.  
The example I had provided of Indonesia’s draft law which has proposed to add 
protective clauses to the Blasphemy laws is incredibly crucial because it offers a template 
towards gradual repair that may be applicable in the case of Pakistan. The draft law states 
that it “will protect everyone’s right to religious freedom, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. It includes the right to believe in whatever they choose to lay their faith in 
and the independence to practice their beliefs. We hope the bill can improve the quality 
of life.”56 The draft law indicates that it includes the protection of all religious minorities, 
including all those outside of the six registered faiths. More specifically, it proposes that 
the state will protect all religious minorities from attacks on places of worship and 
individuals and ultimately, the criminalization of Blasphemy can begin to subside.  
The Pakistani Parliament should seriously consider adding protective clauses to 
the Blasphemy laws and reemphasize and reorient itself in light of the rights enshrined in 
the Pakistani constitution, the rights emphasized by Jinnah’s vision and the rights 
inherent in Islam that all counter the weight of the Blasphemy laws. Using the example of 
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Indonesia, these clauses should not only guarantee protection of all religious minorities 
from attacks but also should develop serious state-run programs in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Justice that monitor and assess the abuse and overuse of the criminalization 
of Blasphemy. The state ought to demonstrate extra protection for high-level political 
figures such as Salman Taseer who speaks out against the Blasphemy laws publicly.  
The skeleton of these potential programs and propositions is already present in the 
Pakistani constitution with regards to group and individual rights, in the Islamic doctrine, 
and in the vision of Pakistan’s founding father Jinnah, who emphasized a prime example 
of secularism and tolerance in the non-West which allows religion to propagate moral 
ethos in the state. The careful and serious implementation of the proposals suggested 
above may begin to counteract the weight of the Blasphemy Laws and begin a gradual 
and nuanced trajectory towards repair.  
 
Conclusion 
The question of religion in the state of Pakistan and the Ahmadi question have 
always and will continue to be inseparable, as I have demonstrated in this paper, for it is 
against the Muslim identity that the function of religion in the state is defined. While the 
hastily applied glue that assembled the nation of Pakistan following Partition had not yet 
dried, the newly migrated populous of Pakistan already began scrambling for the answers 
to the questions—Who is a Muslim? Who is a Pakistani? The multiple visions of the new 
homeland as articulated by Jinnah, Maududi and Iqbal serve as a reflection of the 
multiple forces at play today in defining Pakistan’s future, the role of secularism with 
Islam and the place of the Ahmadis. Jinnah’s vision encompassed both secularism and 
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Islam—emphasized that they are not incompatible and that adherence to the values such 
as human dignity, pluralism, duty and tolerance that are present in Islam ought to be 
strived for and established. His vision, if it had been successfully administered following 
the birth of Pakistan, pays heed to the fourth type of trajectory of secularism that 
Bhargava describes, religion as ideology, when religious moral ethos prescribes state 
implementation of rights for minorities and individuals, and the balance that this type of 
secularism endeavors for. However, given the conditions met by not only the Ahmadi 
community but by so many in Pakistan, the hijacking of Jinnah’s vision of Islam and 
secularism by visionaries such as Iqbal and Maududi and the political expediency that 
subsequently constructed Pakistan have simultaneously destroyed it. Perhaps Pakistan is 
nearing a tipping point with voices and movements that strive to resurrect this balance 
and attempt to reverse the irreversible—bringing Jinnah’s vision of the balance between 
Islam and secularism back to the forefront by “reclaiming Islam” and “reclaiming 
Pakistan.” It is only through such gradual and nuanced unpacking of the Blasphemy laws 
and a balanced understanding of secularism and tolerance that human rights and dignity 










Ahmad, Usman. “Pakistan’s Original Sin.” Foreign Policy. October, 10, 2014.   
http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/13/pakistans_original_sin 
 
Alislam.org.  “A Misunderstanding Removed- Ahmadis Do Believe in the Holy Prophet (saw) as 
Khataman Nabiyeen.” Synopsis of Religious Preaching- Part II, n.d. 
http://www.alislam.org/library/links/khatam_ahmadi.html.  
 
Alislam.org.“A Brief History of Ahmadiyya Movement In Islam.” 
http://www.alislam.org/library/history/ahmadiyya/65.html. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  
 Nationalism. Verso Publications. New York. 1983 
 
Azra Awan. “Human Rights in Islam” http://www.whyislam.org/islam/human-rights-in-islam/	  
 
Barghava, Rajeev. “The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism” T.N. Srinivasan (ed.) The Future  
of Secularism, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2006,  pp.20-53.  
 
Barkey, Karen. “Empire and Toleration” Boundaries of Toleration. New York: Columbia UP,  
2014. Print.   
 
Bhutto, Benazir. Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West. New York: Harper, 2008.  
Print.  
 
Brubaker, Rogers. 1994. “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical  
  Category, Contingent Event,” Contention, Vol.4, No.1, Fall 1994. 
 
Constitution of Pakistan, “Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy,” 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch2.html 
 
Dawn News. “Amidst Religious intolerance, Pakistan’s Nobel Laureate Fades Away.” Dawn  
News Pakistan. July, 30, 2012. http://www.dawn.com/news/738366/amidst-religious-
intolerance-pakistans-nobel-laureate-fades-away 	  
Devji, Faisal. Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea. “The Fanatic’s Reward.” United  
 Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co., 2013 
 
Daud Khattak, Frud Bezhan, “Pakistan’s Ahmadis Face Rising Persecution, Violence”  
http://www.rferl.org/content/pakistan-ahmadis-persecution-violence/24992861.html	  	  
Ebrahim, Zofeen T. “Ahmadis: The lightening rod that attracts the most hatred” dawn.com.  
October 28, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/news/669566/ahmadis-the-lightning-rod-that-
attracts-the-most-hatred 
 
Forman Christian College. “Revisiting Pakistani History with Dr. Ayesha Jalal” May 16 2012  
http://www.fccollege.edu.pk/revisiting-pakistani-history-with-dr-ayesha-jalal 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. “Religion in the Public Sphere,” European Journal of Philosophy 14:1 (2006). 
53	  	  
 10 	  
Hamdani, Yasser Latif. “Are Ahmadis Non-Muslim?” Pak Tea House, December 15, 2011.  
 http://pakteahouse.net/2011/12/15/are-ahmadis-non-muslims/. 
 
History of Pakistan, “Objectives Resolution, 1949,” http://historypak.com/objectives-resolution- 
1949/ 
 
History of Pakistan, “Constitution of 1962,” http://historypak.com/constitution-of-1962/ 	  
Hoodbhoy, Pervez. “Rewriting the History of Pakistan.” Islam, Politics and the State: The 
Pakistan Experience, Asghar Khan (ed.) Zed Books, London, 1985, pp. 164-177. 
 
Ishrat, Waheed. “Iqbal and Democracy.”  
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct93/4.htm 
 
Jaffrelot, Christophe. “Secularization without Secularism in Pakistan.” Centre d’études et de 
 recherches internationales. September 2012. 	  
Jalal, Ayesha. The Struggle for Pakistan. Harvard University Press. 2014. 58, 204-205, 382 
 
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. ”Jinnah’s Broadcast to the People of America, February 1948.” http://m- 
a-jinnah.blogspot.com/2010/04/pakistan-and-her-people-ii-feb-1948.html  
 
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. “Mr. Jinnah’s presidential address to the constituent assembly of  
Pakistan.” August 11, 1947.	  
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html  	  
Khan, Amjad Mahmood 2003 “Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An  
Analysis Under International Law and International Relations. Harvard Human Rights 
Journal Vol 16. 220. 	  	  
Khan, Faraz. “T2F Director Sabeen Mahmud shot dead.” The Express Tribune. April 25, 2015.  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/875557/t2f-director-sabeen-mahmud-shot-dead/ 	  
Kurzman, Charles; Naqvi, Iljaz. “Do Muslims Vote?”Journal of Democracy, 2(3), (April, 2010),  
 pp.50-63. 
 
Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor “Indonesia Law Proposed to Protect Religious  
Minorities” June 11 2015 http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/indonesia-law-
proposed-to-protect-religious-minorities/ 
 
Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor “Indonesia Law Proposed to Protect Religious  
Minorities” June 11 2015 http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/indonesia-law-
proposed-to-protect-religious-minorities/ 
 
Mahmud Ahmad, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din. Invitation to Ahmadiyyat. The London Mosque, 1980 
 





Musharraf, Pervez. “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation” June 1 2004  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html 
 
NBC News. “Bhutto blames Taliban, al Qaida for explosions” Oct 19 2007  
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21374344/ 
 
Nangiana, Umer. “Advanced Learning: The Bright-Eyed Future.” The Express Tribune,  
December 6, 2011. http://tribune.com.pk/story/302768/advanced-learning-the-bright-
eyed-future/ 
 
Perlez, Jane. “Pakistani Taliban Carried Out Attack on Lahore Mosques, Police Say,” New York  
 Times. May 29, 2010. 
 
Persecution of Ahmadis. “Change of Name of Rabwah:  Persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslim  
Community.” https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/change-of-name-of-rabwah/. 
 
Persecution of Ahmadis. List of Ahmadis Murdered for Their Faith”  
https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/list-of-ahmadis-murdered-for-their-faith/ 
 
Persecution of Ahmadis: Problems in Education (2011-2012) 
https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/problems-in-education-2011-2012/. 
 
Persecution of Ahmadis: “Anti-Ahmadiyya campaign in Pakistan 2012) 
https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/anti-ahmadiyya-campaign-in-pakistan/ 
 
Persecution of Ahmadis: “Difficulty in Employment” 
https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/persecution-activities/employment 
 
Persecution of Ahmadis. “Plight of Rabwah (2011 – 2012)” Persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslim  
Community. https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/plight-of-rabwah-2011-2012/.  
 
Qasmi, Ali Usman. The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan. Anthem  
 Press, 2014. 23 
 
Saeed, Sadia. “Politics of Exclusion: Muslim Nationalism, State Formation and Legal  
Representations of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan.” University of 
Michigan, 2010, 6–7, 163-64,  	  
Shackle, Samira. “The Mob Mentality that Prevents Things Improving for Minorities.” New 
Statesman. December 4, 2012. http://www.newstatesman.com/world-
affairs/2012/12/mob-mentality-prevents-things-improving-pakistans-minorities  	  
Stepan, Alfred. “Religion, Democracy and the ‘Twin Tolerations.” Journal of Democracy.  
 October 2000. 2, 42-43 
 
Talbot, Ian. “Chapter 9: Islam Changes Everything?.” Pakistan: A Modern History. Palgrave  
 Macmillan. 2009. 260, 271  
 
55	  	  
UNHCR Refworld: “Pakistan: Information on Ahmadis in Rabwah” 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acb76c.html 
 
USA Today.  “US Doctor Killed in Pakistan in Front of Family” May 26 2014 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/05/26/doctor-shot-pakistan/9614613/. 
 
US Department of State: “Office of International Religious Freedom Annual Report  
2014” http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper 
 
US Department of State: “Office of International Religious Freedom Annual Report 2014”  
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper 
 
World Directory of Minorities: Ahmadis of Pakistan 
http://www.faqs.org/minorities/South-Asia/Ahmadis-of-Pakistan.html 
 
Ziring, Lawrence. “Chapter 10: The Ziaul-Haq Decade.” Pakistan in the Twentieth Century:  




 	  	  
 
 
 
 
